Congress' intent could hardly be more plain. Judicial immunity is no bar to the award of attorney's fees under 42 U. S. C. @ 1988.
[***37]
The judgment of the Court of Appeals, allowing the award of
attorney's fees against petitioner, is therefore affirmed.
It is so ordered.
DISSENTBY: POWELL
PAGE 19 466 U.S. 522, *544; 104 S. Ct.
1970, **1982; 1984 U.S. LEXIS
75, ***37; 80 L. Ed. 2d 565
DISSENT: JUSTICE POWELL, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE, JUSTICE
REHNQUIST, and JUSTICE O'CONNOR join, dissenting.
The Court today reaffirms the rule that judges are immune from
suits for damages, but holds that they may be sued for injunctive
and declaratory relief and held personally liable for money
judgments in the form of costs and attorney's fees merely on the
basis of erroneous judicial decisions. The basis for the Court's
distinction finds no support in common law and in effect
eviscerates the doctrine of judicial immunity that the common law
so long has accepted as absolute.
The Court recognizes that the established principle of judicial
immunity serves as the bulwark against threats to "independent
judicial decisionmaking," ante, at 531. Yet, at the same time it
concludes that judicial immunity does not bar suits for injunctive
or declaratory relief with the attendant claims for costs and
attorney's fees. The Court reasons that "[for] the most part,
injunctive relief against a judge raises concerns different from
those [***38] addressed by the protection of judges from damages
awards." Ante, at 537. This case illustrates the unsoundness of
that reasoning. The Court affirms a $ 7,691.09 money judgment
awarded against a state Magistrate on the determination that she
made erroneous judicial decisions with respect to bail and pretrial
detentions. Such a [*545] judgment poses the same threat to
independent judicial decisionmaking whether it be labeled "damages"
of $ 7,691.09 or "attorney's fees" in that amount. Moreover, as
was held a century and a half ago, an "action before one Judge for
what is done by another . . . [is a] case . . . against the
independence of the Judges." Taaffe v. Downes, reprinted in
footnote in Calder v. Halket, 13 Eng. Rep. 12, 18, n. (a) (P. C.
1840). The burdens of having to defend such a suit are identical
in character and degree, whether the suit be for damages or
prospective relief. The holding of the Court today subordinates
realities to labels. The rationale of the common-law immunity
cases refutes the distinction drawn by the Court.
I
Since 1869, this Court consistently has held that judges are
absolutely immune from civil [***39] suits for damages. See,
e. g., Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978); Pierson v. Ray, 386
U.S. 547 (1967); Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall. 335 (1872); Randall v.
Brigham, 7 Wall. 523 (1869). We have had no occasion, however, to
determine whether judicial immunity bars a [**1983] @ 1983 suit
for prospective relief. See Supreme Court of Virginia v. Consumers
Union of United States, Inc., 446 U.S. 719, 735 (1980). n1 It is
clear that Congress did not limit the [*546] scope of common-law immunities in either @ 1983 n2 or @ 1988. n3 We, therefore, have looked to the common law to determine when absolute immunity
should be available. A review of the common law reveals nothing
that suggests -- much less requires -- the distinction the Court
draws today between suits for prospective relief (with the
attendant liability for costs and attorney's fees) and suits for
